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ABSTRACT 
 
Disaster preparedness is absolutely necessary as the number of both man-made and 
natural disasters increases worldwide. Not confined to any regions or people, disasters 
can result in mass casualties. The United States is not spared from these incidents. Ever 
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States has tried to establish more effective and 
efficient emergency management systems at all levels in order to respond to any type of 
disaster. Due to the effort, much improvement in disaster preparedness was observed 
when mass casualty events happened within the last 10 years. Although there are many 
independent studies for each mass casualty event, there are very few studies done to 
compare multiple mass casualty incidents and find commonly shared lessons. This paper 
aims to determine whether there are any similarities among three mass casualty events - 
2005 Hurricane Katrina, the 2009 Aurora Theatre Shooting, and the 2013 Boston 
Marathon Bombing. Because the response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing was 
vi 
 
the most seamless among the three, the most in-depth investigation was done on this 
incident. Through the examination, the study will also prove if any of the lessons learned 
from these events can be implemented in future mass casualty incidents. To do so, many 
current reports and literature reviews were analyzed. The conclusion gained from this 
study is that there are indeed commonly occurring challenges in disasters and various 
aspects of disaster preparedness that require practice and preparation. In addition, 
learning from others' unfortunate mass casualty incidents and their lessons is an important 
part of strengthening the existing disaster preparedness systems.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The definition of disasters encompasses various phenomena. The American 
College of Emergency Physicians defines disasters as "when the destructive effects of 
natural or man-made forces overwhelm the ability of a given area or community to meet 
the demand for health care."(1) Disasters are not confined to certain regions or people, 
and the United States is not an exception to this indiscrimination.  
 In the United States, there have been increasing number of disasters that resulted 
in mass casualty events. One example is Hurricane Katrina in 2005,whichshocked the 
world by striking New Orleans and causing more than 1000 fatalities. Another one is 
Aurora Movie Theatre shooting in 2009 in which an active shooter attacked a passive 
audience. Furthermore, the bomb attack at the2013 Boston Marathon has demonstrated 
that Boston is not exempt from man-made disasters.  
 Observing the three incidents mentioned above, one can say that each response 
became more efficient and effective compared to one happened before that. Though the 
types of these incidents are different from each other, they share several elements of 
disaster preparedness in common. Therefore, lessons learned from previous mass casualty 
incidents can demonstrate possible solutions to commonly occurring challenges during a 
disaster response. Also, discovering successful aspects of past disaster responses can 
provide an opportunity to disaster response groups across the globe to strengthen their 
existing disaster preparedness systems. 
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OBJECTIVES 
 As delving into the topic of mass casualty events, it was noticed that there is an 
abundance of literature reviews on mass casualty events independently. However, there 
has been a small effort to comprehensively describe and compare multiple mass casualty 
incidents. Such study would clarify strengths, limitations and possible solutions during a 
disaster response, and hospitals and cities would learn from those lessons to be better 
prepared for future mass casualty events.    
 This study will focus on assessing an interesting case of seamless city-wide 
response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing. This section describes the achievements 
of Boston and its hospitals that resulted in 100% survival rate of transported victims. In 
addition, there will be a thorough assessment on the limitations of Boston and its 
hospitals' existing disaster preparedness. Next, there will be an in-depth investigation of 
other mass casualty events due to both natural and man-made causes - Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 and Aurora Shooting in 2012. The achievements and the challenges of all three 
responses will be examined and compared to each other. Knowing the similarities among 
these incidents might provide possible solutions to commonly occurring challenges in 
mass casualty events. These analyses will try to prove that hospitals or cities can practice 
and prepare for any type of disasters as long as they are aware of commonly shared 
elements in disaster responses. 
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
 On April 15, 2013, two improvised explosive devices made out of pressure 
cookers exploded at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Those explosions killed 3 
victims at the incident site and injured more than 250 victims. (2) Although there was a 
high number of the injured, the city of Boston and its hospitals ended up with no death of 
transported victims. This deadly mass casualty event surprised the world because of the 
city's seamless response to the event. Many reports and studies explain what made this 
disaster response possible, yet, they also point out the limitations of current emergency 
management systems in Boston. Below, both the achievements and limitations of 
Boston's disaster preparedness will be described and analyzed.  
ACHIEVEMENTS 
I. Quick Organization of the City's Hospitals 
 In times of disaster, each second can determine injured patients' lives. During the 
response to the Boston Marathon Bombing, the quick decision to alert and organize 
hospitals accelerated the process required for the response. 
 Among many organizations involved in making a timely first response to the 
incident, the Stephen M. Lawlor Medical Intelligence Center (MIC) did a prominent job 
in coordinating medical responders. Since its establishment in 2009, the MIC has 
maintained its advanced communication and information sharing system to allow Boston 
EMS, first responder agencies, hospitals, public health departments, community health 
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centers, long-term care facilities, State and Federal as well as public and private partners 
to disperse information and work collaboratively in response to large scale incidents. (3) 
Figure 1 describes how the MIC interacts and shares information with other organizations.  
 
Figure 1 - The MIC sharing of information with agencies at all levels. Figure taken from 
the Boston Public Health Commission   
 On the Marathon Monday, the MIC was fully prepared for any potential mass 
casualty events that might occur. A team of 12 public health officials were working when 
an on-scene Boston Emergency Medical Services(EMS) staff member alerted the center 
soon after the first blast. Figure 2 shows the timeline of the first ten minutes of the Boston 
Marathon Bombing. 
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Figure 2 - The first 10 minutes of response of  the MIC, Boston EMS, and Boston 
hospitals' Emergency Departments. Figure taken from Kue et al., 2014 
The MIC promptly notified hospitals around the region that there can be a possible surge 
of injured patients due to explosions at the finish line. Also, they included information 
that the explosion victims would have red wristbands, which was important to assist 
healthcare deliverers in efficiently distinguishing explosion victims. The MIC continually 
supported the coordination of agencies and hospitals by sending reports during the 
aftermath of the incident. The reports contained information on patients, hospital supply 
needs, ongoing security updates, and services available to victims. (4) 
 The State Emergency Operation Center also played an important role throughout 
the critical hours of the response to the Boston Marathon Bombing. This center 
constantly updated hospitals in Boston about the incident as time went by. These updates 
included information on the expected number of patients and types of injuries. (5) With 
this information, hospitals could prepare equipment for the vascular and orthopedic 
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procedures which were expected to be necessary for the incoming patients. Furthermore, 
hospitals shared their information on staff availability and equipment by using statewide 
WebEOC system. (5) This system is based on real-time updates, and due to its rapidness, 
hospitals could figure out any problems with their staff availability and lack of equipment 
early on. (5) 
 The importance of sharing information across different organizations during mass 
casualty events is absolutely vital to the success of the response. If the level of 
coordination and communication was not met during the Boston Marathon Bombing, the 
city's hospitals might have lost precious timing to get prepared for the unexpected influx 
of patients and might have led to even more confusion than there already was. In their 
report about the Boston Marathon Bombing, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency(FEMA) points out that sharing situational awareness across public agencies, race 
organizations, and nongovernmental and private organizations was seen in the event, and 
this particular response is transferrable to other mass casualty events. (6) 
 
II. Preparations within the City Hospitals 
 For the Marathon Monday, the 10 local Boston hospitals worked proactively with 
the Boston Athletic Association (BAA). (7) This fact cannot be ignored when discussing 
the reasons for the successful response to the Boston Marathon Bombing.  The hospitals 
that were assigned to help on the Boston Marathon Monday had combined the marathon 
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plan with their own emergency preparedness plan. One of the hospitals involved in the 
event was Newton Wellesley Hospital. This hospital creates its own Marathon  Planning 
Checklist for every Boston Marathon event as listed below (Table 1).   
Emergency 
Department (ED) 
□ Confirm that ED documentation software link is loaded on 
gastrointestinal (GI) computers 
□ Med tackle box for GI 
□ Patient Tracking staff 
□ Department of Public Health (DPH) in Decon/ambulance bay  
□ Patient Tracking staff after DPH leaves 
□ All patients to be directed to ED for triage  
□ Long-distance calling code for ED and GI 
□ Taxi vouchers 
□ Blue bracelets (in triage cart in Decon room) 
□ Contact command center if any elite runner presents 
□ 2 ED nurses in GI to enter in ED tracking system 
□ Process to return elite runner (add to Frequently Asked Questions 
[FAQs]) 
□ Training for staff in ice immersion 
□ Email FAQs to all ED staff prior to marathon 
□ ED will flag lab tests for critically ill patients as Code/Stroke and 
also call the lab 
□ Interpreter Phone on a Pole (IPOP) needed for GI and ED (Transport 
will bring one to GI) 
□ Provide taxi vouchers to college students if schools will not pick 
them up on discharge 
Facilities □ Verify electrical and water hookups operable in front of Cancer 
Center 
□ Ensure brush clear from alternate road entrance 
□ Make sure signage is removed during grounds cleanup 
□ Order Port-A-Potties (charge cost to facilities) 
Nutrition  □ Ensure delivery of Gatorade, bouillon, coffee urns, and pretzels to 
ED by Friday 
□ Large cups with straws and lids 
□ Bottled water and Cans of Gatorade on ice in ambulance bay for 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
□ Same in East and West Lobby behind desk (small quantity) 
□ Contact person with Food and Nutrition on race day to request 
attendance at preplanning meetings and briefings in command center 
□ Stage portable freezer and ice in decon room 
Transport □ Transporters will be in East and West Lobby. 
□ Wheelchairs and stretchers available 
□ All patients who present are to go to ED 
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□ Interpreter available? 
□ IPOP to GI by 9 am 
Materials 
Management 
□ Supply carts to ED and GI by 9 am 
Pharmacy □ Hypertonic saline to ED nurse manager 
□ Med tackle box for GI to Minor Treatment Unit leader 
Environmental 
Services 
□ Process for cleaning tub 
Administration □ Email to doctors and Intensive Care Unit (ICU) regarding early 
discharges on Monday  
Nursing □ Nursing supervisor coverage list to emergency management 
coordinator 
Public Affairs □ Map and memo to patient floors on Sunday with time of road closing 
□ Housewide memo regarding road closure 
□ Communicate with urgent care regarding directions to campus 
□ Public Information Officer will be notified by command center if any 
elite runner presents in ED 
□ Signage for outpatient surgical center—front and back doors  
Radiology □ Verify that Picture Archiving and Communication software is loaded 
on GI computers 
□ Patients in GI needing diagnostic imaging will go to the main 
radiology department 
□ Please enter location of patient when entering exam orders (ED 
versus GI) 
Public Safety □ Check Washington Street for parked cars (towing will begin at 7:45)  
□ Mass Decontamination Unit setup  
□ Block parking spaces at West Entrance 
□ Set ambulance entrance door to open access 
□ Coordinate traffic flow on alternate road (8 am to approximately 4 
pm) 1 hour before and after close/open of Washington Street 
□ Block Employee Garage roof for ambulance staging 
□ Security cameras projected in Command Center 
□ Fire apparatus on site. Stage next to Allen Riddle  
Emergency Prep □ Regional mutual aid coordinating entity (MACE) book 
□ Command Center staffing  
□ Purchase rectal thermometer 
□ Shelter information to Newton Police Department  
□ Megaphones 
□ Tub setup 
□ Decon shower cleared as of 6 am 
Lab □ ED will flag critically ill patients as Code/Stroke and also call the lab 
Communications □ Patient-announcement line with directions 
□ Staff emergency-announcement line 
□ Provide GI with phones to use in patient room phone jacks 
□ Switchboard to make announcement at 7:00 am and 7:30 am 
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regarding parking on Washington Street. Towing will begin at 7:45  
 
Table 1 - A Sample Marathon Planning Checklist of Newton-Wellesley Hospital for the 
Boston Marathon of 2013  
 
With the thorough preparation and analysis from previous years, the hospital was ready 
for many types of emergencies. These ensured ED overcrowding by arranging its 
gastrointestinal suite into a minor-treatment area. Also, they called in extra staff members 
at the hospital for the possible influx of patients. They even paid attention to minor 
details such as having multilingual transport workers on duty considering the high 
percentage of runners who are foreigners. (7) 
 While other aspects are considered to be the strengths of Boston's disaster 
preparedness, the main one pointed out is each hospital's continuous effort to maintain 
and improve its emergency preparedness by regularly conducting drills for all kinds of 
emergency situations. Many analyses mentioned that it was lucky for Boston to have the 
mass casualty event on the Marathon Monday since many systems were in place, 
however, the event was still unexpected. Without the Hospital's routinely performed drills, 
there could have been a greater number of deaths.    
 Each hospital has had its own emergency preparedness drills routinely. BWH 
proved how well-prepared they are as an united team for a wide range of emergencies. 
According to a public health blog by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
BWH had an opportunity to practice 78 emergency scenarios before the Boston Marathon 
Bombing happened. Among those, there were both real world events and scenario-based 
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drills such as chemical attacks, oil spills, train crashes, blizzards, and building 
evacuations. Eight of those events were related to mass casualty events that involved 
explosions and active shooting. (8)These drills have focused greatly on how to avoid the 
ED overcrowding in the time of mass casualty events. For the Boston Marathon Bombing, 
BWH activated its disaster response system by executing a code Amber. This disaster 
response enabled  the emergency department to rapidly transport patients to other 
departments and discharge others in order to build capacity and capability of the 
emergency department. (9) Furthermore, the hospital quickly managed to analyze the 
pending patients for operations and made its operation rooms available for the critically 
injured patients. MGH's disaster preparedness expert, Dr. Paul Biddinger, noted that 
hazardous material (HAZMAT) exercises is one of the practices that contributed greatly 
to MGH's adequate response to the Boston Marathon Bombing. (10) This exercise is 
performed several times every year and includes a wide range of cases from trauma to 
HAZMAT contamination. Through this exercise, the hospital could practice quick 
assessment, security and avoiding ED overcrowding, and perform what they have been 
practicing at the actual mass casualty event. 
 The disaster preparedness exercises in Boston's hospitals included setting up 
command and control systems in a chaotic situation. In a report created by BIDMC 
emergency department about the Boston Marathon Bombing, it mentioned how important 
it was for staff members at the hospital to quickly get into their role as they wait to 
receive their first patient. (11) The emergency department had created a hospital incident 
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command structure (HICS) chart (Figure 3)to delineate key roles in a mass casualty event 
such as the Boston Marathon Bombing. 
Figure 3 - Initial incident command structure. Figure taken from Nadworny et al., 2014 
 
According to their emergency response procedure, the clinical manager is the casualty 
care unit leader for the event. The casualty care unit leader has to make a few key 
decisions in the initial response to the explosions. The leader should be able to understand 
the scope of the event, and the impact that the hospital should experience. According to 
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their previous experience in disaster preparedness exercises, the staff members utilized 
HICS throughout the response. As more staffs arrived at the hospital, the labor pool was 
enlarged, and they improvised and created a chart that fitted the larger labor pool (Figure 
4). 
 
Figure 4- Final incident command structure. CCUL, Casualty care unit leader ; CDU, 
Clinical decision Unit (observation unit) ; CMO, chief medical officer ; CNS, clinical 
nurse specialist; GP , green/purple (lower acuity) ; MRC, medical reserve corps ; PCT, 
patient care technician ; RN, registered nurse. Figure taken from Nadworny et al., 2014. 
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With this orderly command and control system, the department could make a timely and 
effective response without excessive confusion.  
 The preparedness was possible because the leaders of Boston hospitals' disaster 
preparedness team continuously put in effort to learn from others' unfortunate 
experiences. Dr. Walls, the Chairman of  the Department of Emergency Medicine at 
BWH, had pointed out that the Aurora movie theatre shooting has helped his idea of 
emergency preparedness. When the Aurora shooting happened, the University of 
Colorado received 23 patients subsequently, and Dr. Walls' plan only prepared for 
receiving 12 patients per hour. After his realization, he gathered his disaster preparedness 
committee at BWH and asked to "tear up" the hospital's disaster preparedness manual and 
"start all over". (12) With this decision, BWH honed its disaster preparedness and when 
the marathon bombing event occurred, the hospital was able to respond rapidly and 
appropriately.  
 Another point that came up was the appropriate use of residents at involved 
hospitals. It is important for a hospital to know how to expand its labor pool, and at the 
same time, how to make use out of the enlarged labor pool. At BWH, there were general 
surgery residents who professionally helped out in the surge of patients. The Department 
of Surgery at BWH emphasizes the value of graduate medical education. All of BWH’s 
surgical residents have to earn Advanced Trauma Life Support certification. Through this 
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training, the residents learned how to properly assess, triage, and treat patients with 
traumatic injuries (10). Also, BWH has the Neil and Elise Wallace STRATUS Center for 
Medical Simulation. This center had educated all surgical residents to practice and 
improve their clinical and leadership skills where they can refine" technical procedural 
skills", "clinical decision making in code situations", and "behavioral and nontechnical 
skills in simulated trauma scenarios with real-time feedback". (12) Boston Marathon 
Bombing showed how well BWH had trained their residents who hopped into the mass 
casualty event and performed communication, leadership and management skills.  
 
III. Preparations within the City and the State 
 When a mass casualty event occurs, the medical response does not only come 
from hospitals, but also comes from pre-hospital medical providers. Because of that, the 
importance of EMS' initial response and its communication with the city hospitals was 
critical in the Boston Marathon Bombing. EMS' effort to distribute patients evenly across 
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the city hospitals was indeed amazing (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 5 - Patient Distribution occurred within the first 60 minutes of the Boston 
Marathon Bombing incident. Figure taken from a special report from The Journal of 
Bone and Join Surgery and the Journal of Orthopedic and Sports Physical Therapy, 2014 
The Boston Marathon finish line was cleared of patients within 18 minutes. James 
Hooley, the Chief of Boston EMS, pointed out that 18 minutes of complete clearing was 
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possible because EMS staffs and ambulances improvised in the event. Not strictly 
keeping up with standard protocols, EMS ambulances took 3 to 4 patients out of the 
incident site. According to Chief Hooley, Boston EMS personnel are trained thoroughly 
to a plan, but are also given the tools and authorities to deviate from plans if required. (7) 
Boston EMS' appropriate decision making enabled the hospitals to have more time to 
treat severely injured patients and therefore lower the number of deaths due to the event.   
 Boston EMS was also trained well to triage patients quickly and use the tools that 
they would not use in the civilian world to prevent victims from losing too much blood. 
Rapid triaging by Boston EMS allowed the most severely injured victims to be 
transported to hospitals. Furthermore, Boston EMS staff were ready to employ the use 
tourniquets. Early tourniquet use has been critical in reducing the number combat deaths 
in the military operations involving blast injuries with improvised explosive devices 
(IED). (13) Though it is rare for civilian EMS staffs to use tourniquets, Boston EMS has 
included tourniquets and related trainings in its hemorrhage-control protocols for years.  
(14) Boston EMS' effort to be prepared for a wide array of emergency situations played a 
critical role in the Boston Marathon Bombing. . The rapid reaction of Boston EMS as a 
result of their disaster preparedness contributed to the low number of deaths. 
 There was also the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency(MEMA) 
involvement in coordinating the citywide preparedness for each year's Boston Marathon 
Monday. This team assembled various multidisciplinary agencies in January 2013 in 
order to build plans for the upcoming Boston Marathon. For 3 months, this team 
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developed emergency response plans for a possible mass casualty event by arranging 
periodical meetings with the stakeholders of the Boston Marathon. (15) On April 15, 
2013, the Multi Agency Coordination Center (MACC)  in the MEMA Emergency 
Operations Center was activated for the Boston Marathon. These are the list of agencies 
that sent their staffs to the MACC - Boston EMS, police, fire, and public safety personnel 
from Boston and the other seven cities and towns, Massachusetts State Police, National 
Guard, Commonwealth Fusion Center, FBI, Coast Guard, and BAA. This multiagency 
communication center managed to continuously share information with the MIC. (15) 
Preparations made by MEMA also helped the city to be ready for the mass casualty event. 
Prophetically, MEMA had a pre-Marathon tabletop exercises in 2012 which discussed the 
possibility of multiple IEDs at the finish line. (7) Even though there was a great 
possibility that there could have been an unexpected problem to arise within this complex 
communication system, this team handled the mass casualty event with clear sharing of 
information through multiple exercises.  
 Special preparation was certainly done for the Boston Marathon, however, it is 
important to point out that Massachusetts emergency medical team, in recent years, 
developed strong communications, coordination, and response capacities and capabilities 
with police and fire departments, local businesses and volunteer groups. (15) In order to 
test their emergency response procedures, they not only used scenario-based drills, but 
also used other large-scale events that happened in Boston. Dr. Biddinger mentioned in 
an interview that "full-scale federally sponsored Urban Shield exercises that typically 
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involve 600 people and 50 agencies" particularly helped the city and his hospital's 
emergency response team to be effective in the Boston Marathon Bombing. (7) He also 
mentioned that there were other citywide exercises like the Urban Shield exercises. These 
exercises gathered the entire Massachusetts emergency response teams to work together 
and do a scenario-based drill. One of the goals of these exercises is to figure out what 
each agency will be doing in the time of emergency and what their capacities and 
capabilities are. (7)  
 One of the exercises performed by the city of Boston was surge exercises and 
patient distribution. The Massachusetts Department of Public Health (DPH), Boston EMS, 
the Boston Public Health Commission (BPHC), and the city hospitals had their parts in 
these exercises. The goal of surge exercises is to distribute patients to the city hospitals 
according to a set emergency response procedures and to have the city hospitals clear the 
emergency departments as they still take care of the patients, reschedule elective 
surgeries, and make operating rooms available for the surge of injured patients. Trauma 
services at BWH, a team led by Dr. Jonathan Gates, also participated in surge exercises. 
As his team went through these exercises, they were able to find "holes" to their plans. 
The first one was that there should be an incident commander in a large-scale, mass 
casualty event, and there should also be a communicating system between the hospital 
and the "deep bench" of surgeons who are not always easily reachable through the 
hospital's page-operator system. These exercises prepared BWH to be fully functioning 
for the Boston Marathon Bombing, which would have been difficult without the exercises 
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and drills. The result of these practices was clearly shown through the Boston Marathon 
Bombing, where the city, which was trained as one team, indeed coordinated 
appropriately to respond to the surge of patients. 
 Boston had been willing learn from others' unfortunate experiences in order to 
refine its emergency response procedures for mass casualty events. Emergency response 
leaders in Boston studied the literature in order to gain lessons from other cities that went 
through mass casualty events. The city hosted two symposia in 2008 and 2009, which 
were sponsored by CDC and the Harvard School of Public Health. (14)These symposia 
focused on preparing for terrorist bombing incidents in Boston. Many speakers from 
different countries came to Boston in order to deliver their speeches. The speeches were 
insightful in that they brought up a few critical limitations that they had to encounter. 
Limitations included difficulties in triaging patients, figuring out which patients are the 
most severely injured ones, and challenges that might occur in hospital's operations due 
to limited time to be ready for the surge of patients. (15) This information greatly 
contributed to Boston's disaster preparedness, and resulted in successful response towards 
the Boston Marathon Bombing.  
 
CHALLENGES  
I. Crowded ED 
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 The Boston Marathon Bombing showed that the emergency departments should 
stay as orderly as possible when a mass casualty event occurs. One of the challenges that 
occurred during the incident was that many of good-willed physicians  "self-deployed" to 
the emergency departments of two hospitals, BWH and BIDMC. (16) Though it was 
necessary to have a larger labor pool during the response, Meg Femino, director of 
Emergency Management at BIDMC, figured out that it was important to make sure the 
ED was not over-crowded with the flood of self-deployed staffs. Femino decided to make 
a self-deployed clinicians waiting area so that they can be pulled out from the labor pool 
when it was necessary. (16)  
 Learning from Femino's improvisation, hospitals responding to a mass casualty 
event should be expecting the surge of voluntary staffs, and make sure these staffs are 
directed to the right area, and be informed that they will be pulled into the situation when 
it is necessary. 
 
II. Unidentified Patients 
 Though Boston's health care facilities delivered the best possible care to the 
victims of the Boston Marathon Bombing, there was still a great challenge faced by them 
- correctly identifying patients.  
 While BWH had debriefings about its response to the incident, staff members of 
BWH mentioned several difficulties that came up with patient identification. BWH had 
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been using a customized electronic health records system which was optimized to be 
effective and efficient for the specific facility. This system has been used for 30 years, 
which is unlike other hospitals that are now having transitions to electronic health records 
system. (17) 
 Under a normal circumstance, when a trauma patient comes in and staff members 
are not able to get the patient's personal information, the emergency department would 
assign the patient a temporary name. The unidentified patient would receive 
"Unidentified" as the last name and a unique three-letter combination as the first name. 
The electronic tracking board would reflect the patient's name, sex and location within 
the department. (18) The patient's actual name would be reflected in the system once 
registration staffs receive the patient's information. According to Dr. Adam Landman, an 
emergency physician and BWH's chief medical information officer for health information 
innovation and integration, the system is effective and efficient under a normal condition 
when the department only has one or two trauma patients at a time. (17) 
 Problems arose when the Boston Marathon Bombing occurred. BWH received 19 
patients within 30 minutes of the first blast. There was also a time when multiple patients 
arrived all at once, and all of them required surgical procedures. In this chaotic situation, 
staff of the emergency department quickly assigned those unidentified patient with names 
and put their main effort on providing medical care on those patients. As a result, the 
electronic tracking board showed tiles of numerous unidentified patients with the first 
initial followed by the last name such as "V. UNIDENTIFIED", or "A. UNIDENTIFIED". 
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(Figure 6) As shown in the figure, the only unique part of the patients' names was the first 
initial, which was assigned randomly. Due to this issue, the staff members had to spend 
extra time to distinguish one patient from another, and also had radiology staff and 
consultants who came to the ED with an order for a patient and could not depend on the 
electronic tracking board to identify the patient's physical location. (17) 
 
Figure 6 - Several unidentified patients with names that were hard to be distinguished, 
checked in to the electronic tracking board. Figure taken from Landman et al., 2014 
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Dr. Landman confessed in his review that inability to distinguish patients from one 
another made "patient care challenging and potentially unsafe." (18) 
 Furthermore, there was delay in the response due to the "difficult-to-distinguish" 
names, which were entered by the emergency department and were successively 
"propagated" to all hospital information systems.  Downstream information systems 
included the automated medication dispensing system, radiology, laboratory systems, and 
the operation rooms and inpatient units used the indistinguishable names since those were 
what they received from the hospital information systems. Therefore, there was a delay 
created as the staff members had to perform manual identification of each patient in order 
to avoid any confusion. (17) 
 In their review, Landman and his peers concluded that BWH's original naming 
convention could have resulted in medical errors, confusions, inefficiencies, and patient 
harm during the event and under a normal condition when there is more than one 
unidentified patient. (18) A workgroup gathered in order to identify other institutions' 
naming conventions, and there were multiple ones they found effective and efficient 
(Figure 7). 
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Figure 7 - Patient naming strategies that are currently in use by multiple institutions. 
Figure taken from Landman et al., 2014. 
Out of all the options, BWH's medical information team chose the best solution to this 
issue, which would suit their hospital's information system. Since the electronic tracking 
board shows the first letter of the first name and the full last name, they decided to put 
"unknown" for every unidentified patient's first name, and "UNK-M/F-YYY" as his or 
her last name. M/F indicates a patient's sex, and YYY will be a distinctive phrase such as 
color, state, street name, or lake. (17) An example of the name of an unidentified female 
patient would be "U. UNK-F-BLUE". When another mass casualty event occurs, BWH's 
emergency department will be using colors first, and then go on to the next category of 
unique phrases when colors are all assigned to patients. (18) BWH shifted to the 
improved naming convention in July 2, 2013, less than three months after the Boston 
Marathon Bombing. Their effort to quickly find out the problems they have in their 
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information system helped the hospital to be better prepared for the next event with more 
than 6 casualties, and the new system was confirmed to be functioning as intended.  
 In his paper, Dr. Landman suggested that there should be standardized naming 
convention for unidentified patients at the national level, which could be accessible to all 
hospitals and electronic health record vendors. This would allow more unified system that 
can be recognized and understood by every health care providers and hospitals' staff 
members in the states.  
 
III. Patients' Physical Locations 
 Another problem that came up alongside of patient identification was difficulties 
in recognizing patients' physical locations. As seen in Figure 6, the electronic tracking 
board also shows locations of patients. However, since the patients were indistinguishable, 
staff members had hard time locating patients and being aware of their status. (18) 
Especially, it was challenging for the emergency department providers doing initial triage 
because they were not aware of where the patients were being treated and which rooms 
were vacant for the next surge of patients. (18) Fortunately, there were BWH staff 
members from other departments who were voluntarily coming into the emergency 
department, and they played a role as "runners" in checking each room and letting initial 
triage staffs know about it.  
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 Dr. Landman's team assessed the challenges that occurred due to the lack of 
situational awareness among the staff during the mass casualty incident. They identified a 
major cause to the challenge to be the delay in electronic tracking board update. There 
were too many critically injured patients coming in all at once, and all the staff members 
were concentrated on patient care. Knowing this, BWH's emergency department 
operational leadership group implemented educational and workflow changes in order to 
make patient check-in and tracking during a mass casualty event to be more efficient and 
effective. The trainings and changes were created based on much research on the 
literature reviews, assessments on their response to the Boston Marathon Bombing, and 
discussions with other trauma centers such as Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical 
Center(TASMC).  
 Another solution to raising situational awareness in a mass casualty event is to 
assign a nurse to be a unit leader. During the Boston Marathon Bombing, nurses who 
would usually be in charge of each unit participated in patient care, and therefore were 
not able to take on leadership roles. Learning from this experience, BWH created the unit 
leader position within the hospital's incident command system, which will reinforce the 
"nurse-in-charge" role which is critical to maintaining patient status information. (18) A 
unit leader will be in charge of managing the beds and providers; keeping the electronic 
tracking board updated real-time; and communicating with triage by phone, radio, or 
runner in a mass casualty event. (18) 
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III. Documentation of Assessments, Orders, and Procedures 
 Patient care delivered by the staff members at BWH was effective and efficient. 
However, since the focus was mostly on the rapid patient care, the staff did not pay as 
much attention to computer tasks and procedures. (18) Verbal orders for medication and 
laboratory orders were delivered instead of electronic orders in real time. (18) There were 
no serious issues created due to this problem, but there definitely could have problems 
occurred due to staffs' loss of ability to keep the electronic records simultaneously with 
treatments and orders.   
 "Bypassing electronic health record data entry is not uncommon when care is 
delivered to critically ill patients", says Dr. Landman. (18) Often, when a trauma patient 
comes in, providers would take care of updating electronic health record once a patients 
becomes stable. Unfortunately, the situation was completely different in the Boston 
Marathon Bombing in which there were many patients coming in all at once. These 
patients could have been left without order or documentations for hours since there was 
no electronic health record entered. (18) What BWH's medical information team noticed 
during the Boston Marathon Bombing was that there were many providers coming in 
voluntarily within a short period of time after the incident occurred. Many could have 
participated in patient treatment, however, they also could have been assigned to do more 
of information management tasks as scribes, entering orders and working on medical 
documentations. It has been proven that scribes played a critical role in improving 
operational efficiency in an emergency department's operations. (19) As so in daily 
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operations, it is hoped that scribes in a mass casualty event reduces the time spent on 
electronic documentation and order entry.   
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LESSONS FROM AURORA MOVIE THEATRE SHOOTING, 2012 
 In Aurora, Colorado, there was an active shooting incident during the showing of 
the movie, “The Dark Knight Rises” at the Century 16 movie theatre. The incident 
resulted in 12 deaths and 57 injuries. (20) This type of massacre has rarely happened in 
the past, and the types of injuries occurred were closer to war wounds rather than regular 
trauma injuries. In spite of the severity of the incident, the city of Aurora was able to 
respond to the situation in a right way. There have been several reports that have 
analyzed the disaster preparedness of the city and the main hospital, University of 
Colorado Hospital, involved in the incident. In the following pages, what enabled the 
quick and effective emergency response and what challenged the response will be 
discussed.  
ACHIEVEMENTS 
I. Flexibility and Creativity 
 During the response to the shooting incident, injured victims were transported to 
nearby hospitals via police cars and private cars instead of ambulances. The reasons for 
this were due to traffic and pedestrian congestion in the parking lots. The parking lots 
were exceptionally crowded with randomly parked, unattended police cars. (21) On top 
of the inability of ambulances to access the theatre, there was no coordinated 
transportation group set up even by the end of the response. Even with this challenge, 
police officers and firefighters quickly made a decision to transport those who were 
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injured via their own police cars. Out of the police officers who transported the wounded, 
there were officers who had never trained in patient care. Furthermore, there were private 
cars involved in patient transportation, and they carried 13 patients out of 60 patients who 
were transported to hospitals. (Table 2) Many of the transporters were untrained, yet they 
were prepared to be flexible and creative in patient transportation.  
Number of Patients Transported to Hospital Mode 
20 Ambulance 
27-28 Police Vehicle 
13-14 Private Vehicle or walked (one) 
60 Total 
Table 2 - Mode of Transport for Victims  
 Victims of the active shooting incident had severe wounds. Each minute was 
critical for each patient, and without the decision to transport patients as quickly as 
possible via non-ambulance vehicles, several more patients likely would have died, 
according to the hospitals which treated the victims. (21) Although they did not receive 
an approval from the higher command center, the police officers did not wait, rather they 
focused on saving lives by performing unconventional transportation. As a result, all of 
the victims who were transported to the hospitals survived. (20) According to an 
increasing number reports in the of medical literature, it has been suggested that this type 
of expedient transport, even without the benefit of pre-hospital care, is associated with 
improved outcomes for victims of penetrating trauma to the thoracic-abdominal region. 
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(22, 23)All patients who required immediate interventions were appropriately transported 
to hospitals within 52 minutes from the first 911 call, in fact, many much sooner than that. 
(21) This rapid reaction of the police department demonstrates the importance of giving 
first responders authority to improvise in a mass casualty event.   
 
II. Rapid Transition to a Disaster Response Mode at the Hospitals 
 The University of Colorado, which received 23 patients within the first 30 
minutes of the incident, activated a Code D. A Code D is a code for disaster response at 
the hospital. As soon as the code was activated, the hospital quickly transitioned itself 
into the disaster mode. When the hospital received a call about the incident with not 
much detail, its emergency department was almost full - 49 out of 50 beds were filled. 
(20) The rapid transition required sending all the extra resources to the emergency 
department, and also decompressing the department by offloading patients who were in 
the emergency department to the post anesthesia care unit. Furthermore, the hospitals 
strengthened their security unit in case they became another target in the chaotic situation. 
(24) In a shooting incident, it is always important to make sure that the person who shot 
victims cannot get to a hospital in order to finish his or her job. (25)  
 Patrick Conroy, a manager of support services for University of Colorado 
Hospital, has pointed out that all these actions were taken immediately due to the 
hospital's practices and drills for different types of disasters in the past, much like what 
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was seen with Boston’s response to the bombings. (20)In fact, the hospital had completed 
34 preparedness activities such as a policy review, drills, training and table-top exercises 
to date. (24) Back in 1999, there was an active shooting incident at Columbine High 
School. This incident helped hospitals in Colorado be better prepared for massive 
casualty events. Denver Health Medical Center was a part of the response, and 
Christopher Colwell, emergency services director, has said that the hospital had 
"obviously done a lot of training exercises since [the Columbine shooting] to try to 
prepare for an event like that." (25) 
 
III. Mental Health Support  
 In many reports related to the Aurora shooting, it was accentuated that the 
hospitals focused on psychological support of the health care providers, victims and 
victims' families and friends. When the active shooting incident happened, the hospitals 
made sure that the loved ones of the victims could contact the hospitals to figure out the 
victims' status. University of Colorado Hospital established a hotline within the first 12 
hours of the emergency. (24) More than 2000 calls of those who were searching for loved 
ones were received at the hospital. Furthermore, University of Colorado Hospital 
coordinated with other hospitals and its partner, the Tri-County Health Department, to 
organize the patient list of each facility in order to have family members be directed to 
patients' current locations. (24) Indeed, the Tri-County Health Department's main 
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responsibility during the event was to ensure that each facility had a common operating 
picture for the incident, one of the aspects on mental health support. (20) 
 A part of disaster preparedness plans in Aurora Mental Health Center was to have 
volunteers available during a response to an emergency situation. An 18-member 
volunteer disaster team was quickly activated after the shooting incident, and their task 
was to deliver "timely and immediate psychological first aid." (22) There were the 
disaster response team, fully-staffed hotline, school response team, and other mental 
health services joining to form a small mental health unit. This unit served more than 
3000 people who were seeking mental health support after the mass casualty event. (20) 
 The mental health care was maintained continuously beyond the day of the 
incident. According to a report, the month after the shooting, Aurora Mental Health 
Center had a 58 percent increase in mental health visits. The center not only received 
patients, but also sent out mental health support teams to the various local school once 
schools were back into session. In the mean time, the center also cared for their own staff 
and made sure that they do not become overstressed. For their burned out staff members, 
the center brought in a masseuse. (20) 
 
CHALLENGES 
I. Communication between Police and Fire Departments 
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 The outcome of the city of Aurora's response to the shooting incident could not 
have been better. All the injured patients transported to hospitals survived. However, 
many reports had pointed out that there was still room for improvement. One of the 
difficulties of the night of the disaster was the lack of communication between the police 
department and fire department of the city, which led to the absence of a unified, joint 
command during the first hour of the incident.  
 According to an after action report on the incident, the police department was not 
able to or did not know how to communicate directly with the fire department, even 
though there was a fully interoperable radio system. Because there was no 
communication between these two departments, the fire incident commander could not 
figure out the severity of the event or the risk level in the movie theatre. Fire commanders 
did not know when the police had arrested the criminal, which caused delay and 
confusion in their response. (24) 
 On top of that, ambulances arrived on site in a timely manner, however, they 
could not get to the theatre and the wounded. The major reason for that situation was not 
only due to a crowded parking lot, but also due to the lack of communication. Although 
police incident command was aware of how ambulances could access the incident site, 
the police did not provide directions or instructions for the fire department and EMS, 
assuming they could navigate their own way through the parked cars as had police 
vehicles. (21) On the other hand, the fire department did not seek for directions or 
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assistance from the police to ease ambulance access to victims. As a result, the police 
vehicles had to transport critically injured patients who needed immediate care.  
 
II. Patient Identification 
 On the incident site, triage was done quickly, however, there was a problem with 
patient identification because there was little use made of any patient identification 
system during the triage or treatment phases of the response. (21) There was an effort 
made by Century Triage Group to use tags for the wounded, but the system was soon left 
behind, because the healthcare providers were not familiar with the system. The huge 
challenge arose when the lack of patient identification created confusion downstream 
because all the patient records were incomplete. This confusion created difficulty for 
providers to sort the large influx of trauma patients in a timely and effective manner. (25) 
 There were no known, documented mistakes made in patient treatment due to the 
lack of patient identification. However, there could have been mistreatment due to the 
confusion. The greater problem was a confusion created among family members and 
friends of the victims. The police and victim advocates were not able to get information 
on patient status to answer family questions on the status of loved ones. Since there were 
close to 80 victims, the police and victim advocates had trouble collecting and 
distributing information on patient's names, status and locations. (26) 
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LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA, 2005 
 When Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, the city saw themselves in 
a rather vulnerable state. The deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history at that time  left the 
city with $220 billion in damages and more than 1800 deaths. (27, 28) Though disaster 
preparedness had been strengthened ever since 9/11 incident happened, the U.S.  was still 
not thoroughly prepared for different types of disasters, which could be either natural or 
man-made. (29) Many reviews pointed out that the city of New Orleans was basically 
unprepared in all aspects of disaster preparedness. The city had big storms that passed by 
previously by luck, and they kept hoping for the same to happen when they first heard 
about Hurricane Katrina. (30) There were lessons learned from Katrina, and these 
surprisingly had much similarity with the two other mass casualty events of a completely 
different disaster type.  
ACHIEVEMENTS 
I. Commitment of Medical Responders 
 Unlike many other disasters happened in the U.S., Hurricane Katrina was 
exceptional in that the damaged areas included multiple states. Medical providers could 
not avoid the disaster since there was no specific target population. During the response 
to the incident, medical providers, many of whom had themselves lost their houses and 
family members, stayed professional and committed and did all they could in the 
devastating situation.  
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 On top of the local medical responders, there were volunteer health providers 
coming from all over the places. Their presence reduced the burden of those local 
responders, and took the initiative to work against inefficiencies in the medical support 
system and meet patients' needs. (31) Though there was a lack of resources, harsh 
environments and conditions working against their response, healthcare providers at all 
levels did not stop putting their best effort in caring for the sick.  
 
CHALLENGES 
I.  Lack of Advanced Planning 
 After Katrina hit Louisiana and other states, many reviews studied the case to 
identify problems within the state's existing disaster preparedness plans. Many reviews 
constantly emphasized that Louisiana indeed had disaster plans. In fact, it was the matter 
whether those plans were effective or not. The state's response to Katrina proved the 
impracticality of those disaster plans. 
 First of all, the state of Louisiana has such a small number of trauma centers - 
there are only 2. (32) Most types of disasters require immediate medical response. 
However, as the number of trauma centers in Louisiana clearly depicts that the state 
cannot be effective and efficient in their response to critical natural disasters such as 
Katrina, Colorado with similar population size compared to Louisiana has 62 trauma 
centers, and Iowa with smaller population size to Louisiana has 116.  (32) 
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 Furthermore, hospitals and nursing homes in Louisiana were required to set up 
their own disaster response plans. This policy put a great deal of responsibility on these 
medical facilities that led to a lack of inter-operability. The state had set up an example 
plan such as Louisiana Model Nursing Home or Home Health Emergency Plan. 
(30)When Katrina hit Louisiana, nursing homes were all alone in seeking out the 
appropriate care from hospitals or other facilities to establish the safety of their patients. 
The nursing homes were also required to pre-arrange patient evacuation and sheltering 
via contracts with commercial carriers. (32) These many requirements and policies 
proved to be ineffective in response to the disaster.  
 
II. Lack of Incident Command  
 As a major aspect of emergency preparedness, practical control and command 
system during emergencies is required to be planned. The federal government has noticed 
the lack of structured command system during and after hurricane Katrina, and since then, 
it has been emphasizing the unity of command during emergencies. (33) 
 Due to the impact of Katrina, state command and control facilities were not able 
to share information, even though their system were intact. Furthermore, federal 
command and control agencies were not able to communicate with each other. This lack 
of communication led to the incomplete unity among command and control agencies at 
all levels from local to federal. This situation is similar to what we saw in the Aurora 
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shooting incident, where there was no communication between the fire and police 
departments who were not able to communicate with each other when there was even an 
interoperable communication system.   
 The state emergency operations centers (EOCs) had challenges in coordinating 
and sharing information among themselves and other agencies. Several factors came up 
as reasons for these difficulties. First of all, there was overwhelming number of requests 
for aid of the centers. Second, the EOC building and main room were very crowded by 
the large number of state and federal officials. (34) The main room had 200 people in it, 
while its capacity was up to 50 people. Furthermore, the EOC building was crowded with 
750-1000 people in it. (34) Lack of physical space led to much confusion and difficulty in 
communication among the EOC personnel. The EOCs were also visited by politicians 
and celebrities which created greater overcrowding and distracting the EOC personnel 
form their tasks that required immediate attention. Another major problem occurred with 
the EOCs' Information Technology systems. The Information Technology was 
overloaded due to the excessive number of additional computers using the system and the 
amount of information being processed. (34) The system was too unstable to operate at its 
optimal level.  
 The lack of communication was the reason why agencies involved in the response 
to Katrina could not reach the maximal level of coordination. A published report has 
described that maximal coordination can be reached when there is unity of command, 
unity of effort, and an accepted chain of command. (34) Though all response groups were 
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working toward caring for the people both displaced and trapped and reconstructing the 
impacted area, their destroyed command infrastructure worked against their effort. 
Without unity of command, there could not be an accepted chain of command during and 
after Katrina. 
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DISCUSSION 
 In the comparison of three key disasters that occurred in the U.S. within a 10 year-
period, many aspects of disaster preparedness keep appearing to be significant. While 
there are commonly shared lessons learned from the three events, there are also some 
aspects of emergency responses that were not shown in common. Therefore, those 
aspects will be compared and analyzed. In this section, it is hoped that sharing these 
comprehensive lessons learned from the three mass casualty events would strengthen 
disaster preparedness systems of any hospitals or cities around the world.  
 
ADVANCED PLANNING 
  Boston was ready for the mass casualty incident at the Boston Marathon because 
the city had put much effort in advanced planning. The city's emergency management  
agencies,  hospitals, police and fire departments, and EMS all participated in mass 
emergency drills, which had happened consistently for many years. These drills allowed 
for the groups to go over which parts of their emergency preparedness were practical or 
not and which parts needed improvements. It also appeared in the Aurora shooting that 
constant practice of emergency drills help better prepare for disasters. University of 
Colorado Medical Center was able to respond quickly to the shooting incident by rapidly 
transitioning into emergency mode. Before patients arrived, the hospital was ready to 
assess and treat them. The staff member of the hospital stated that the hospitals had done 
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drills and exercises for different types of disasters, and these helped them have stronger 
emergency management system. What lacked in Louisiana was practical emergency 
management plans. As a result of insufficient funding for the state's emergency 
preparedness, the emergency management plans often remained paper-based, without 
practicality. This inefficient plan ended up costing the state multiple times more than it 
would have cost them to have a practical emergency plans. (32) A great lesson learned 
from all three mass casualty events is that emergency management plans should focus not 
only on the mobilization of great numbers of resources, but also on the installation of 
mechanisms to organize these resources.  
 Several recommendations for advanced planning came up while comparing the 
three mass casualty events. In one of the reviews, it was mentioned that a former army 
nurse made a decision based on her experience at Honduras during the Boston Marathon 
Bombing response. (8) This shows how important it is to incorporate the experienced 
ones' knowledge into hospitals' disaster preparedness. Civilian hospitals and public health 
agencies should gather with their military counterparts and learn from their experience 
and knowledge to improve existing emergency preparedness before an actual mass 
casualty event occurs. Furthermore, Boston had consistently put in efforts to enhance 
their plans by learning from other mass casualty events. The city of Boston hosted 
conferences on emergency preparedness in recent years. Lessons learned by cities, which 
suffered terrorist bombing incidents were delivered by many speakers from different 
places around the world. Learning from others' experience greatly refines one's existing 
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disaster preparedness system. Last, there should be actual drills and exercises happening 
in a city, which should incorporate all emergency response groups from local hospitals to 
federal agencies. Through these practices, these groups shall thoroughly review their 
emergency management plans and figure out what would need improvements and what 
was practical or not.  
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
 As current technology improves, information technology for emergency 
preparedness should also improve. Common challenges that occurred during the three 
mass casualty events included maintenance of communication networks and medical 
records. 
 Communication during the response to the Boston Marathon Bombing stayed 
efficient and effective. Particularly, the State Emergency Operation Center played a 
central communication arena throughout the critical hours of the response. This center 
had the WebEOC system that could update hospitals in Boston about the incident real-
time. Due to the well established system, the information about the expected number of 
patients and types of injuries was delivered timely to Boston's hospitals which could 
prepare properly for incoming patients. The Aurora Shooting incident showed how much 
confusion can occur due to a lack of communication between the response groups, police 
and fire departments. Although their interoperable communication network was intact, 
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they were not able to use it. It is likely that they had never practiced using it. This implies 
the importance of acquiring a communication system, but also knowing how to use it. In 
the aftermath of Katrina, federal government pointed out that the response to Katrina was 
less effective due to a critical challenge on communications. It was recommended that 
current laws, policies, plans, and strategies related to communications should be reviewed 
by the Department of Homeland Security. Furthermore, the Department of Homeland 
Security should cooperate with the Office of science and Technology Policy to develop a 
National Emergency Communications Strategy that allows communications operability 
and interoperability. (34)This recommendation clearly depicts the importance of 
communications among response groups of all levels - federal, state, and local.  
 As a preparation for emergency situations, agencies should test their 
communication networks in drills and exercises and make sure they are aware of the 
manual for the network systems. Furthermore, they should think about a situation where 
communication infrastructure gets destroyed either by men or nature. Alternative 
communication system should be planned for an incident like that. High-tech information 
technology is needed, but low-tech and no-tech solutions should not be underestimated. 
In a case of tornado in Greensburg, Kansas, the state used printed newsletters as a means 
to distribute information about potential health issues during the aftermath of the tornado. 
Their method suggested a possible use of paper forms in the absence of electronic 
systems in a disaster. (35)  
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 Medical record system is important for patient identification. Many Boston's 
hospitals studied challenges during their response to the Boston Marathon Bombing, and 
several of them mentioned difficulties in patient identification due to difficulty reading 
electronic record board. During Katrina incident, caring for the sick became a huge issue 
since a large number of the displaced patients got marked by different agencies in their 
own distinctive ways. A unified easily-read electronic medical record system across a city, 
state, or even country will allow unification of records, and it will reduce confusion 
among healthcare providers when a patient gets displaced to another region or transported 
to another healthcare facility. If the system gets implemented everywhere in the U.S., 
there would be no worries about losing the patient's medical records.  
 
STRENGTHENED SECURITY SYSTEM 
 In both man-made and natural disasters, increased security issues is observed. For 
a man-made disaster such as terrorist attacks, hospitals should ensure that security system 
is strengthened in order to protect victims and themselves from being the second target of 
the attack. In an active shooting incident, the shooter is often injured or killed and may be 
transported to the hospital for medical care. Since there will be a patient surge, it might 
be hard for responders to distinguish the shooter from victims. Therefore, it is important 
to search patients for guns. In a natural disaster, there is an increased chance of public 
disorder. In order to prevent public disorder, there should be enhanced public safety and 
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security. It is recommended for future disasters that disaster response groups at all levels 
should build security systems which have practical operational mechanisms suitable for 
different types of emergencies. These security systems will prevent greater casualty from 
happening. 
 
EMOTIONAL SUPPORT FOR ALL THE INVOLVED PERSONNEL 
 It was particular of Aurora Shooting incident that Aurora Mental Health Center 
instantly activated its volunteers for emotional support. The support was provided to not 
only patients and their family members, but also healthcare providers. They even brought 
in masseuse for tired staff members. What is not demonstrated in the literature reviews 
for Boston Marathon Bombing is emotional support for responders. Often, the mental 
health of the responders is overlooked. However, they are the ones who work in a 
devastated situation, constantly encountering situations, which seem to be hopeless. It is 
an important responsibility of response groups to take care of their workers' mental health 
so that they would not be exhausted. 
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Conclusion 
 Mass casualty events have been occurring throughout the history of the U.S., and 
it will be impossible for the country to avoid another one. Boston, which only had three 
terrorist attacks since 1990, had a devastating and unexpected event due to two bomb 
attacks at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. If Boston were not prepared, the attack 
could have resulted in a great number of deaths. However, no one among the injured who 
were transported to hospitals ended up passing away. This event teaches everyone around 
the world an important lesson.  The city's enormous effort to refine emergency 
preparedness learning from their practices and others' unfortunate mass casualty events 
and each responder's commitment for recovery resulted in no death of transported victims. 
This study has shown that hospitals and cities can prepare for emergency situations with 
much practice and education. Just as other cities' unfortunate mass casualty events were 
studied by Boston in order to strengthen its emergency preparedness, the Boston 
Marathon Bombing shall serve as a case to raise an awareness around the world about the 
importance of emergency preparedness.  
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